Before the US opened Linebacker II attacking the North of Vietnam in 1972, Uncle Ho and Vietnamese leaders foresaw this US plot, so they instructed the Vietnamese Army and people to carefully prepare for the US air operations. At the same time, Uncle Ho and Vietnamese leaders pursued the proper strategy of “fighting and negotiating”, using victories in the battlefield to gain advantages in the Paris Peace Talks.

Prediction of enemy’s losses

On the afternoon of December 18th, 1972, on a flight to Vietnam from Paris, Le Duc Tho, the Head of the Vietnamese delegation participating in the Paris Peace Talks, stepped up to the pilot cabin to talk with the pilots. He said: “Where are your families? You should evacuate your families as far as possible. The situation is very complex.”

When our plane landed in Gia Lam Airport, several cars immediately carried us to our office in Nguyen Canh Chan Street, Hanoi. Without any rest after the long flight, we started to move documents from our office to safe places and all wanted to finish the work quickly in order to go home. But, Le Duc Tho came and said: “All of us can not go home. We should stay here.” We kept working in our office and 2 hours later, US B52s began bombing Hanoi, Hai Phong and other northern localities, starting their Linebacker II.

Thanks to prior good preparations, our troops and people made up a people’s air-defence power network, ready to fight back against US aircraft. In fact, the Party and Uncle Ho had foreseen the US plot beforehand and instructed the involved forces to draw up a unique and creative combat plan against US air operations using its B52 strategic bomber. In 1967, Uncle Ho told General Phung The Tai, the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Air Defence and Air Force, that the US would, sooner or later, use B52s to attack Hanoi and that they would only surrender when they were defeated in a Hanoi air battle.

He continued to say: “You should keep in mind that, before signing the Peace Agreement with North Korea, the US conducted destructive air operations on Pyongyang. In Vietnam, the US will lose the war, but they will only surrender after they have been defeated in Hanoi airspace.”

Taking a unique opportunity

From late 1965, the Party and Uncle Ho drew up the policy “Fighting and negotiating” for our struggle against the US. After that, the Party and Uncle Ho also gave specific guidelines and instructions on the policy to our Army and people. The Resolution of the 13th Meeting of the third tenure Party Central Committee in January 1967 stressed: “It is time we should struggle with the enemy in the diplomatic front as we have been winning over the enemy and gained advantage in the battlefield. In international circumstances, a struggle against the enemy on the diplomatic front could take an important and active role.”

On December 28th, 1967, President Ho Chi Minh chaired a meeting of the Politburo to discuss and approve the 1968 Spring General Offensive Operation. On the Eve of the 1968 Lunar New Year Festival, as usual, Uncle Ho sent a New Year Greeting to all people and troops. The 1968 New Year Greeting was also seen as an appeal for the General Offensive Operation. 

The 1968 Spring General Offensive Operation dispirited the US ambitious plan and forced US President Johnson to announce on US TV on March 31st, 1968 that the US was ready to unilaterally stop bombing the North of Vietnam and agreed to negotiate with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On May 13th, 1968, the first negotiation between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USA was officially held in Kléber Convention Centre, Paris, opening to the “Fighting and negotiating” state as predicted by the Party and Uncle Ho. At that time, the Vietnamese side’s goal was to ask the US to stop bombing the North unconditionally and forever, as well as stop all other war activities against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

On October 13, 1968, our negotiation delegation in Paris received an instruction from our Politburo. However, if our delegation had followed the instruction, our side could have missed a rare opportunity to force the US to stop bombing the North, as our Party leaders at home were not able to be instantly updated on the changes in the situation in Paris. The situation was so urgent and the issue was so important that it could not be discussed indirectly with Party leaders at home. So, Le Duc Tho, in his capacity as the leader of the delegation, decided to return to Hanoi. As soon as he arrived in Hanoi, the Politburo had meetings for 3 straight days (from October 17th to 19th) to thoroughly discuss the emerging issue and draw up directions for the next negotiations with the US in Paris. Thanks to the correct assessment and directions, our delegation won the negotiation with the US; as a result, the US stopped bombing the North unconditionally, opening to a quadripartite negotiation drive (Paris Peace Talks). The first victory at the negotiation table once again indicated the wisdom and creativity of our Party and Uncle Ho in the struggle with the enemy, in both the battlefield and diplomatic fronts.    

From victory in Hanoi airspace to achievement in Paris

As predicted by the Party and Uncle Ho, on the evening of December 18th, 1972, the US used B52s to strike Hanoi. On the same day, the US sent a diplomatic note to our delegation in Paris, asking to delay the negotiations until December 26th. It could be said that using B52s to bomb Hanoi, Hai Phong and other northern localities was R. Nixon’s final gamble. During his presidential campaign, he resorted to the image of a pigeon but now he appeared to be a cruel hawk just after he won the elections. R. Nixon and the leadership of the Pentagon must have overvalued the strength of their B52 strategic bomber and considered the aircraft an invincible weapon. In fact, their plot to use B52s to attack Hanoi, Hai Phong and other northern localities had been drawn up long before and named “Linebacker II”. While they thought that their B52s were inviolable and their plan was complete, they forgot to assess the strength of the Vietnamese people and Army and did not study Vietnam’s history about its fighting against foreign invaders.

During the historic 12 days and nights, our people and Army shot down 81 US aircraft, including 34 B52s and 5 F111s, and captured dozens of US pilots. R. Nixon’s plot to conquer the Vietnamese steel will by “turning the North of Vietnam into the stone-age” completely went bankrupt. The Nixon Administration could not do anything to calm the Sai Gon Regime’s nerves, while international opinion turned against the US, criticizing them for their massacres of Vietnamese civilians in their bombings. The US could not have any choice, but stopped bombing Hanoi and the North of Vietnam and returned to the Paris Peace Talks.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Politburo had meetings for 3 days straight and agreed that our negotiation delegation led by Le Duc Tho would meet the US side at the Paris Peace Talks again to continue the negotiations. Finally, the Paris Peace Agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam was initiated on January 23rd, 1973 and officially signed on January 27th, 1973.

According to Le Duc Tho, the great victory in Hanoi airspace forced the US to sign the Paris Peace Agreement.

Written by Luu Van Loi, Special Secretary to Le Duc Tho at the Paris Peace Talks

Translated by Thu Nguyen

Source: qdnd.vn